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Abstract  
 
As a business model under the emerging social interaction behavior, 
crowdsourcing gather public knowledge, skills, and information to 
help companies directly face consumers, fully explore innovative 
product design and sales markets, and make full use of Internet 
advantages to respond market demand. This paper explores 
crowdsourcing contest which is under a fixed bonus mechanism. The 
purpose of crowdsourcing is to maximize the sum of bid submitted 
by contestant. First, we establish utility function both the contestant 
and the Crowdsourcing and then the optimal solutions to 
Stackelberg game and then analysis results show that: The increase 
in the number of contestants will increase the effort for the contest 
and then decrease; the lower the cost parameter of the contestants, 
the higher the expected utility; due to the limited ability of 
contestants, bonuses can’t infinitely motivated contestants, so as the 
bonus increases, crowdsourcing crowdsourcing’s expected utilities 
increases first and then decrease. 
 
Keywords:  
Crowdsourcing 
Multiple attributes 
Bonus 
Number of participants 
All pay auction. 
 
 
Licensed:  
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 License.  
 
Publisher: 
Scientific Publishing Institute 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of the Internet, an emerging business model emerged, such as 
crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing is not only rapidly penetrating in research and development, market 
development and other fields, but also widely used in creative product design, advertising design, marketing 
strategies and so on. Companies are innovating through crowdsourcing models. Through this model, the task 
which should be completed by the company's employees will be handed over to the public through the 
Internet. Innovating through crowdsourcing contest can not only reduce the cost of innovation but also 
promote the company. For instance, in order to develop a better collaborative filtering algorithm, Netflix hold 
a crowdsourcing competition offering a million dollars to the contestant who can develop a better 
collaborative filtering algorithm. 
Crowdsourcing contest can be modeled as multi-attribute reverse auction, because the crowdsourcing 
wants to evaluate the bid submitted by the contestant in many aspects. David, Azoulay-Schwartz, and Kraus 
(2002) builds a procurement multi-attribute auction model and provide the best strategy for buyers and 
sellers. However, some of the parameters in the model are not adapted to the actual economic activities. Some 
scholars have optimized the model 
In order to maximize the utility of both the contestant and the crowdsourcing, various scholars have 
studied the participation strategies of both parties. For the crowdsourcing, many scholars have studied their 
reward strategies, entry fee strategies, information feedback strategies, and the number of participants; for the 
contestant, many scholars study the bidding strategy of the contestant. Archak and Sundararajan (2009) 
studied the bidding strategy of different risk preference contestant and the bonus distribution strategies of the 
crowdsourcing for different risk preferences. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) studied the bidding strategy of the 
contestant and the bonus distribution strategy of the crowdsourcing under the condition that the cost function 
of the acceptor is linear and nonlinear. 
Yang, Chen, and Pavlou (2009) through research on second-hand data, it is found that the higher the 
bonus amount set by the crowdsourcing, the more contestants to participate in the crowdsourcing contest. 
The greater the number of crowdsourcing contest, the more intense the competition, so that the quality of the 
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bid submitted by the contestants can be significantly improved. And Taylor (1995) found that an increase in 
the number of contestants would increase the intensity of the crowdsourcing contest, but this would reduce 
the probability of winning and increase the time, experience and communication costs to review the bid. So ，
Che and Gale (2003) recommended to reduce the number of participants to 2. And Morgan and Wang (2010) 
think setting entry fee can limit the number of people participating in the crowdsourcing contest. But 
Terwiesch and Xu (2008) found that for creative competitions and experimental competitions, more answerers 
can increase the diversity of solutions, thereby increasing the publisher's revenue. It is the best choice without 
charging admission fees. Schöttner (2008) doesn't think that admission fees should be charged in order to 
avoid the platform or the crowdsourcing seeking personal gain.  
In summary, more research has focused on the issues related to crowdsourcing contest under a single 
attribute of a single crowdsourcing task. However, in order to get high-quality solutions in crowdsourcing 
contest, how to design effective incentives to attract potential contestants, maximize the interests of 
crowdsourcing parties and participants, and enhance the innovation ability of enterprises. Important issues 
that need to be addressed in creative crowdsourcing. Chawla, Hartline, and Sivan (2015) considers that the 
utility of the crowdsourcing is the best effort of all contestants and the sum of the efforts of all contestants. 
The former is more used in research and development competitions, design competitions, etc.; the latter is 
mainly for brainstorming and broadening ideas, the utility of all the crowdsourcing in this paper adopts the 
first type. In addition, unlike previous scholars' research on crowdsourcing contest, this paper uses the 
relevant theory of multi-attribute reverse auction, analyzes the quality attributes of bid, establishes the utility 
model of both the contestants and the crowdsourcing, and studies the bidding strategy of the contestant. The 
bonus strategy of the crowdsourcing and the expected utility of both the contestant and the crowdsourcing. 
 
2. Model 
In the crowdsourcing contest, firstly the crowdsourcing announces the requirements for bid, the scoring 
rules, the minimum score minS  for the program and the size of the bonus through the crowdsourcing 
website. And then the contestant designs the bid according to the scoring rules and their own utility and 
submit. Finally, the crowdsourcing calculates the score of each creative plan according to the scoring rule, and 
the highest scored contestant receives the bonus. The crowdsourcing website issues bonuses to the winners.  
 
In order to facilitate the study, the following assumptions are given: 
Assumption 1. The crowdsourcing and contestants involved in crowdsourcing are rational and the 
preferences for the various attributes of the bid are relatively independent. 
Assumption 2. The each attributes of the bid are independent, that is, the value of one attribute does not 
depend on the value of other attributes 
Assumption 3. The utility function of the crowdsourcing meets the conditions: 0c
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. That is, the increase in the effort of the contestant 
on the attributes of the bid, and the cost will increase. 
Assumption 4. Each contestant’s cost parameter   is a private information. The crowdsourcing knowns only 
the distribution function of the cost parameter. It is assumed that   is independently and identically 
distributed uniform distribution over  ,   ,according to a distribution function   ,continuously 
differentiable density    .  
 
2.1. Cost Function of the Contestant 
The contestant will pay for his own ideas and abilities in order to obtain the crowdsourcing bonus, and 
the contestant will generate the cost. The higher the contestant’s cost parameter, the more effort is needed to 
realize a particular quality level. When the cost parameter of the contestant is its upper bound  , the bidding 
strategy and the utility of the contestant is zero.  
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When contestant with cost parameter   provides bid with quality attributes 1,..., ,...,k mq q q  , the cost of the 
contestant is 
 
1
, = k
m
t
k k k
k
C q a q 

                                                      (1) 
The cost parameter   is independently and identically distributed uniform distribution over 
 ,   ,according to a distribution function   ,continuously differentiable density    ; ka  is the cost 
coefficient assigned to k-th attribute by the contestant, and 0ka  ; kq is the value of the k-th quality 
attribute of the bid; in order to ensure the marginal cost of the contestant is increasing, so set 1kt  . 
 
2.2. Utility Function of the Contestant  
The contestant with the highest effort wins the prize M . Crowdsourcing contest is similar to all pay 
auction, if the contestant wins, it can get positive income. If the contestant can't win, then the effort can't get 
any return. The contestant who wins the first place in the crowdsourcing contest will receive all the bonus, so 
if contestant wins, its utility function is 
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If the contestant does not win the first place, its utility function is 
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2.3. Utility Function of the Crowdsourcing 
The utility function of the crowdsourcing is  
1
k
m
s
c k k
k
U w q M

                                                        （4） 
kw  is the weight given to the k-th attribute assigned by the crowdsourcing, it indicates the degree of 
preference for different attributes published by the crowdsourcing. The utility of the crowdsourcing is 
increasing, and the marginal utility is diminishing, so 0 1ks  . 
 
2.4. Scoring Function of Crowdsourcing 
Compared with the single attribute evaluation, the multi-attribute evaluation of the bid is mainly reflected 
in the judgment of multiple aspects of the submitted bid when determining the winner. Because the bidder's 
bid needs to be evaluated from multiple attributes, it is necessary to develop a scoring function according to 
the bidder's preference for bidding, so that the bid submitted by the contestant can be comprehensively 
evaluated to maximize its utility. Therefore, the scoring function can be determined by its utility function. In 
order to maximize its own utility, the scoring rules published by the crowdsourcing may be different from the 
real utility function. This difference can be achieved by the difference between the attribute weights kW  
published by the crowdsourcing in the scoring function and the attribute weights kw  reflecting the true 
preference in the utility function. 
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3. Optimal Strategy for Both Parties  
3.1. Optimal Bidding Strategy for the Contestant  
In the crowdsourcing contest, the bidding strategy of the contestant is to determine the optimal attribute 
values to maximize his utility according to the scoring function published by the crowdsourcing and its own 
income function. 
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Adding the quality attribute value of the bid to the crowdsourcing contest will increase its cost, but if the 
quality attribute of the bid is reduced, the probability of winning will be reduced, so it is necessary to optimize 
the attribute value of the bid. 
The probability that the contestant gets the first place is     
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the first-order conditions (FOC) is as follow: 
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By solving the above equation, the following solution is gained： 
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According to the hypothesis, the cost parameters of the contestants satisfies uniform distribution, the k-th 
attribute value of the contestant is affected by the contestant's own cost parameter   and the quality attribute 
cost coefficient of the bid ka , so the optimal bidding strategy for the k-th attribute is: 
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It can be seen from Equation (6), for the bid with multiple attributes, the value of each attribute is related 
to the amount of the bonus announced by the crowdsourcing, the cost parameter of the contestant and the 
number of participants in the competition. 
 
3.1.1. Expected Utility of the Contestant  
The contestant bids with the optimal bid combination  * * *1 2, ,..., kq q q . At this point, the expected utility 
of the contestant is 
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According to the hypothesis, the cost parameters of the contestants satisfies uniform distribution. 
Therefore, the expected utility of the contestant is 
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It is known from the expected utility expression of the contestant that the expected utility of the 
contestant is independent of the cost coefficient of each attribute, and is only related to the cost parameter of 
the contestant, the number of participants in the competition, and the bonus. 
 
3.1.2. Score of the contestant 
In the crowdsourcing contest, in order to prevent the contestant from joining to provide bids with the low 
quality, so the crowdsourcing sets the minimum score S when the crowdsourcing contest task is announced. 
The contestant compares the score of his bid with the minimum score required by the crowdsourcing, if 
bS S , the contestant will participate in the crowdsourcing contest. Therefore, each contestant needs to 
calculate his own score before participating in the competition. 
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Take formula (6) into formula (5), the score of the contestant is 
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In the crowdsourcing contest, the crowdsourcing sets the minimum score for bid. For the crowdsourcing, 
on the one hand, it can prevent the contestant from joining to provide bids with the low quality; on the other 
hand, it can help the crowdsourcing to filter out some of the bids with lower quality. For the contestant, it can 
help contestant make decisions about whether to participate in the crowdsourcing contest. 
 
3.1.3. Related Factor Analysis  
（1）The cost coefficient of each attribute affects the bid value of the attribute  
In order to study the effect of cost coefficient on quality attribute values, take the first derivative of 
formula (6) with respect to ka ,  
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Observing the above formula 
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. Therefore, the greater the cost coefficient of the attribute, 
the less effort the contestant will make on the attribute. 
 
（2）The effect of the cost parameter on the bid value of the attribute  
In order to study the effect of cost parameter on quality attribute values, take the first derivative of 
formula (6) with respect to  , 
   
 
 
 
1
1
2 2
1 1 1
k
N N t
k
kk k
q M N M N t
dt
aa t t


   
        
 
 
                
        

 
Observing the above formula 
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, it can be seen that the higher the cost parameter of the 
contestant, the less effort the contestant will make on the attribute. This seems to be inconsistent with 
common sense, but actually in this mode where the first contestant gets all the bonuses, a contestant with a 
lower cost parameter means that it is more capable and has higher expectations for the quality of the bid 
submitted by itself, so more effort will be put into bidding for each attribute. 
 
（4）The impact of the cost parameter of the contestant on its expected utility 
In order to study the effect of cost parameter on its expected utility, take the first derivative of formula (8) 
with respect to  , 
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Observing the above formula 
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, the higher the cost parameter of the contestant, the lower the 
expected utility. This can promote the contestant to continuously improve their abilities to make them more 
competitive int the contest. 
 
3.2. Optimal Strategy of the Crowdsourcing  
The highest quality contestant submitted in the crowdsourcing contest receives the bonus. In order to 
maximize the expected utility, the crowdsourcing must consider setting the bonus amount. 
 
3.2.1. Expected Utility of the Crowdsourcing  
The expected utility of the crowdsourcing is the sum of the quality of the bid submitted by the contestant. 
This paper use SP  to express the expected utility of the crowdsourcing. According to formula (4), the 
expected utility of the crowdsourcing can be expressed as 
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Take formula (6) into formula (9), the expected utility of the crowdsourcing can be expressed as 
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It can be seen that the size of the bonus amount, the number of contest participants, the weight given to 
each attribute by the crowdsourcing, and the distribution of the ability of the contestant affect the utility of the 
crowdsourcing. 
 
3.2.2. Bonus Strategy  
Under the fixed reward mechanism, the crowdsourcing can set the appropriate bonus amount to highlight 
the advantages of the crowdsourcing contest. Because the increase in the amount of bonuses can encourage 
contestants to make more efforts, but it also increases their own costs, this paper will next study the impact of 
the size of the bonus on the utility of the crowdsourcing. 
In order to maximize the utility of the crowdsourcing, take the first derivative of formula (10) with respect 
to M , make the derivative equals to zero, and solve the equation. Then we can get formula (11). 
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By observing Equation 11 you can find the value of the bonus that can’t be directly obtained. But if 
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Observing the above formula, we can find 
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, this shows that the expected utility of the 
crowdsourcing has an optimal solution for the bonus. 
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The increase in the amount of bonuses in a certain range can motivate contestants to make more efforts 
for the crowdsourcing contest; but the bidder’s own ability is limited, the bonus can’t infinitely motivate the 
contestants, so the bonus should be set reasonably. 
 
4. Analysis of Crowdsourcing Contest Results  
Suppose an crowdsourcing publishes a crowdsourcing task and a bonus of ¥1,000 on a crowdsourcing 
website. The crowdsourcing also announces the scoring rule and the lowest score. The crowdsourcing 
evaluates the bid from two aspects ( 1q 、 2q ). The weight given to the two attributes by the crowdsourcing is 
1 25, 3W W  , give the power of two attributes to 1 2
1 1
,
2 3
s s  ; The cost coefficient and power of the 
contestant for the two attributes 1 23, 2a a  , 1 21, 2t t  . The cost parameters of the contestant are 
uniformly distributed over the interval  0.5,1.5 . We separately influence the impact of the cost parameters 
and cost coefficient of the contestant on the bidding strategy. First consider the impact of the cost coefficient 
of the contestant on the bidding strategy of the contestant. As shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure-1. The impact of the cost coefficient of the contestant on the bidding strategy. 
 
As can be seen from the figure, the greater the cost parameter of the contestant, the less effort the 
contestant will make on the bid. The cost coefficient of the contestant for the attribute and the power of the 
quality attribute have an effect on the bid of the attribute, the bidder's bid for this attribute is very sensitive to 
changes in kt . The larger the cost coefficient of the attribute, the less effort the contestant will make on the 
attribute. 
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5. Conclusion 
Crowdsourcing has played an increasingly important role in enhancing corporate innovation capabilities 
and has become one of the research hotspots in academia. This paper studies the crowdsourcing contest under 
the fixed bonus mechanism. The purpose of the crowdsourcing is to maximize the sum of the quality of the bid 
submitted by the contestant. This paper builds a crowdsourcing model based on the multi-attribute reverse 
auction model to get the equilibrium bidding. Through research, it is found that the higher the cost parameter, 
the lower the expected utility of the contestant. In addition, the increase in the amount of the bonus can 
motivate the contestant to pay more for the bonus. However, because of the limitations of the ability of the 
contestant, the bonus amount is not unlimited for the incentive of the contestant. The discussion of bid、cost 
parameters and bonuses in this article is also for the crowdsourcing parties to better implement and utilize 
crowdsourcing. 
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